中国楼市下行：更深且分化

Comprehensive analysis

S&P’s October 2025 assessment (supported by national and industry data) shows the property correction in China is both larger and more structural than earlier assumed. Key quantitative signals:

• Nationwide primary sales projected ≤9 trillion RMB in 2025 (about half of 2021), with a further 6–7% decline forecast for 2026 and primary prices down ~1.5–2.5% in 2026 (S&P/CNBC).
• Real estate investment fell ~12% YoY in Jan–Jul 2025; July alone down ~17% (industry data). New starts dropped ~19.4% and unsold inventory reached ~774 million sqm (up ~4.2% YoY).
• Financial stress: developer bond defaults and restructurings have surged; >500bn RMB of developer debt maturing in 2025; bank property‑related NPLs rose (~4.2% reported).

Drivers and causal links:

1. Demand shock & confidence erosion — household exposure to property is large (est. ~70% of household assets), so price falls produce negative wealth effects that reduce consumption and mortgage appetite; PBOC and surveys show purchase intent remains historically low.
2. Financing squeeze & liquidity mismatch — constrained developer access to new funding increases project stoppages, delays completions and amplifies social/credit risk.
3. Policy calibration — central easing in 2025 was modest (5‑yr LPR -10bps vs -60bps in 2024); local policies shifted in 2H‑2025 (targeted loosening, acquisition/recapitalization programs), but the scale and targeting vary by city, limiting uniform stabilization.
4. Structural reallocation — SOEs and state‑linked buyers have gained ground in land purchases and project rescues, accelerating market polarization (SOE share of land take >60% in 2025 sample data).

These dynamics feed into a reinforcing loop: weak sales → lower cash inflows → reduced new starts → weaker materials demand and fiscal receipts (land revenue drop) → slower local fiscal capacity → constrained policy ammunition.

Key insights

• Depth and duration: The shock is deeper than consensus; 2025 was worse than expected and 2026 carries downside risk without stronger policy. S&P’s baseline implies a U‑shaped recovery with stabilization likely only in late 2026, contingent on policy and confidence repair.
• Structural rebalancing: Market is polarizing—core tier‑1/2 cities and high‑quality projects (improvement/“good‑house” demand) outperform; many tier‑3/4 markets face multi‑year de‑stocking (some cities with >36 months).
• Policy effectiveness is heterogeneous: Central measures (inventory purchases, incentives, credit facilities, public housing programs, and targeted rate relief) are necessary but insufficient if implementation and funding are uneven across localities.
• Macro linkage: Real estate remains a ~20% GDP contributor via direct and upstream channels; persistent weakness depresses steel, cement, home appliances and broader consumption through wealth and income channels.

Risks & opportunities

Risks (near/medium term):

• Continued funding stress for mid/smaller private developers → defaults, unfinished projects and social risks.
• Local fiscal pressure as land sale revenues compress → reduced capacity for large‑scale inventory interventions.
• Confidence trap: slow reversal of household expectations would limit the impact of supply‑side or credit measures.

Opportunities (conditional/strategic):

• Policy‑driven inventory absorption: targeted government acquisition, accelerated urban renewal and city‑level “housing bank” programs can materially shorten de‑stocking if scaled.
• Secondary market & services: growth in resale transactions, rental housing and property services (management, renovation) provides selective investment and revenue stability.
• Selective asset purchases: SOE‑backed and high‑quality mixed‑use operators with diversified cashflows present defensive/relative value opportunities.

Conclusion & recommendations

For policymakers:

• Scale & target interventions: accelerate inventory purchase/repurposing programs, paired with clearer pricing/usage rules to speed local implementation; prioritize completion and “keep delivery” funding to avoid social and financing spillovers.
• Restore demand cost‑effectively: further cut mortgage rates/margins (5‑yr LPR transmission), expand targeted subsidies (first‑time and family support) and ease verifiable purchase constraints where local fundamentals justify.
• Strengthen resolution frameworks: coordinated restructuring channels, creditor‑protector mechanisms and transparent project completion funds to lower systemic risk.

For developers / corporates:

• Prioritize liquidity and completion: preserve cash to finish on‑site projects; adopt conservative leverage and contingency plans.
• Rebalance portfolio to mixed‑use, rental and services income; selectively pursue urban‑renewal/land‑value capture projects with local support.

For investors:

• Be selective: avoid highly leveraged pure‑residential developers and firms with large offshore debt; favor mixed‑use operators, SOE‑backed names and property services/home‑improvement exposures.
• Watch policy and city‑level signals: differentiation across cities will drive returns—monitor land auctions, pre‑sale issuance and local inventory metrics.

Outlook summary: Without a materially stronger and well‑coordinated policy package and visible improvement in household expectations, downside risks persist through 2026. Even with successful policy execution, recovery is likely U‑shaped and investors should anticipate 2–3 years of structural adjustment before normalization.